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Abstract
A co-evolving and adaptive Rock (R)-Paper (P)-Scissors (S) game (ARPS) in which an agent
uses one of three cyclically dominating strategies is proposed and studied numerically and analyt-
ically. An agent takes adaptive actions to achieve a neighborhood to his advantage by rewiring a
dissatisfying link with a probability p or switching strategy with a probability 1 − p. Numerical
results revealed two phases in the steady state. An active phase for p < pcri has one connected
network of agents using different strategies who are continually interacting and taking adaptive
actions. A frozen phase for p > pcri has three separate clusters of agents using only R, P, and S,
respectively with terminated adaptive actions. A mean-field theory of link densities in co-evolving
network is formulated in a general way that can be readily modified to other co-evolving network
problems of multiple strategies. The analytic results agree with simulation results on ARPS well.
We point out the different probabilities of winning, losing, and drawing a game among the agents
as the origin of the small discrepancy between analytic and simulation results. As a result of the
adaptive actions, agents of higher degrees are often those being taken advantage of. Agents with a
smaller (larger) degree than the mean degree have a higher (smaller) probability of winning than
losing. The results are useful in future attempts on formulating more accurate theories.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg 02.50.Le 89.75.Fb
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based modelling is an important tool for studying the autonomous actions of in-
dividual entities and their interactions [1, 2] in complex systems. The interactions often
reflect how agents compete, especially in the context of competing games. Examples of
some extensively studied games are the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift game (SG), and
stag hunt game (SH) [1, 3–5]. These are two-strategy games with agents having a choice
of two possible options. In the present work, we focus on the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
game [1, 3, 6], characterized by three strategies that dominate each other cyclically. De-
pending on the context, the strategy of an agent can be regarded as his state, character,
opinion or species. The strategies are related cyclically through: Rock (R) crushes Scissors
(S), Scissors (S) cuts Paper (P), and Paper (P) covers Rock (R) [1, 6, 7]. Despite its sim-
plicity, many phenomena in nature can be described within the framework of RPS game. A
well-known example is related to the mating strategy of the common side-blotched lizards
(Uta stansburiana), a species of lizards found in the western coast of North America [8].
Other examples include phenomena in marine ecological communities [9], coexistence of dif-
ferent kinds of microbes [10–12], and in chemical and biological systems [1, 6, 7, 13]. There
are phenomena in economic and social systems, e.g., human decision-making processes and
epidemic diseases, that also involve cyclical dominance and they can be studied within the
RPS framework [1, 7, 14].
An interesting question is how network structures [1, 6] affect the RPS game. The focus
so far has been on static networks, i.e., the links connecting two competing agents are fixed.
For RPS agents interact in a square lattice [15] with the loser updating the strategy to be
that of the winner, spatial self-organized patterns emerged. Szabo´ et al. studied the small-
world effect on RPS game by replacing a fraction r of the links in a square lattice by links
that connect two randomly selected agents [16]. It was found that two qualitatively different
phases result, depending on the value of r. Szolnoki and Szabo´ studied the RPS game in
Kagome, honeycomb, triangular, cubic, and ladder-shape lattices [17]. They found that
while the spatial dimension of the lattices affects the transitions between different phases
strongly, the clustering coefficient does not.
Going beyond static networks, co-evolving networks have attracted much attention in
recent years [1, 2, 6, 18, 19]. In co-evolving networks, an agent may switch his strategy
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or alter his competing neighbors so as to attain an environment that is to his advantage.
Such adaptive actions couple the dynamics of strategy selections and network evolution. Co-
evolving networks invoking PD, SG, SH games have been studied [1, 2, 18–21]. In particular,
the present work is motivated by the two-option adaptive co-evolving voter model [22] and
the dissatisfied adaptive snowdrift game [20, 23]. In the co-evolving voter model [22], there
are two opposite opinions competing for dominance in an initially random regular network
and agents prefer to be surrounded by like-opinion neighbors. When an agent interacts
with a randomly chosen neighbor of the opposite opinion, he has a probability p to cut
the link to the neighbor and rewire it to a randomly chosen agent of the same opinion.
With a probability 1 − p, the agent is convinced by the neighbor and switches to the op-
posite opinion. Both actions are rational in that the agents tend to pursue local consensus.
Despite its simplicity, the phenomena are rich. For values of p below (above) a critical
value, the system evolves into an active (a frozen) phase in which the network evolution
and strategy selection continue (cease). Similar adaptive actions (i.e. switching strategies
and rewiring the links to dissatisfying neighbors) were included in the model of dissatisfied
adaptive snowdrift game (DASG) [20, 23]. In DASG, adaptive actions are taken when agents
become dissatisfied with non-cooperative neighbors. The resulting network is either in a dis-
connected, dynamically frozen, and character-segregated phase or a connected, dynamical,
and character-mixed phase, depending on a payoff parameter. Analytic approaches to co-
evolving networks require careful treatment of spatial correlations [24]. Other examples in
which similar adaptive actions are invoked include a reversed opinion-formation model [25]
and an inverse voter model [26, 27]. Networking effects, including co-evolving networks, also
pose challenging questions to analytic approaches. Typically approaches such as mean field
approximation and pair approximation [1, 6] often only give results in qualitative agreement
with simulations [1, 20, 22–24, 26, 27]. The reason is that the adaptive actions are sensitive
to the local competing environment and thus spatial correlations are important. We have
made various attempts in understanding the key factors in formulating theories that better
capture spatial correlations [23, 24, 27–30]. An improved mean field theory was shown to
give good results for DASG [24] and the inverse voter model [27].
Here, we generalize the study of adaptive co-evolving models to cyclic multiple-strategy
case. In particular, an adaptive and co-evolving RPS model, abbreviated as APRS, is
proposed and studied in detail. Our model is different from the adaptive RPS model studied
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by Demirel et al. [31]. The agents in adaptive RPS model prefers to have neighbors of the
same option by an adaptive mechanism in which an agent who lost a RPS game adopts the
strategy of the winner or to seek a new neighbor of the same opinion. The authors focused on
the time evolution of the fractions of agents using the different strategies. In our model, the
agents take adaptive actions to enhance their chance of winning. We focus on the different
phases exhibited in the steady state and the formulation of analytic approaches. In Sec. 2,
we define our model and identify the key features as revealed by simulations. The model
is parameterized by a probability p of rewiring an unfavorable link. The system evolves to
two different phases for different ranges of p. In Sec. 3, a theory based on the densities of
different kinds of links connecting agents of different strategies is constructed. Results are
found to be in good agreement with simulations, with small yet noticeable discrepancies.
In Sec. 4, we point out that the small discrepancies are important hints for studying the
validity of the assumptions in a theory. We analyze the dependence of the probabilities of
winning and losing of different types of agents. These probabilities are found to depend on
the role of an agent in an adaptive process and his degree. These features are usually not
included in analytic approaches. Although the context of ARPS is studied, the discussions
on the formalism of mean field theory and its validity are intentionally carried out in a
general form. As such, the analysis here can be readily applied to other co-evolving network
models with two or more options or strategies. Results are summarized in Sec. 5.
II. ADAPTIVE ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS MODEL AND KEY FEATURES
Consider a system of N agents. For concreteness, the agents are initially connected via
a random regular graph of uniform degree µ and each of them is assigned one of the three
strategies (R, P, or S) with equal probabilities. In a time step, an agent, referred to as the
active agent, is selected randomly. If there is no connected neighbor, i.e. of degree zero, there
will be no action and the time step ends. Otherwise, the active agent selects a connected
neighbor, referred to as the passive agent, at random. They interact via a RPS game. If
the active agent wins or there is a draw, he is satisfied and no adaptive actions take place.
If the active agent loses, he is dissatisfied and he will take one of the following adaptive
actions: (i) with a probability p to cut the link to the passive agent and rewire it to another
agent (called the rewiring target) randomly chosen from all the agents in the system who
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FIG. 1: Schematic illustrations of the adaptive actions of an active agent.
are not a neighbor, or (ii) with a probability (1 − p) to switch his strategy to the one that
can defeat the passive agent. Figure 1 illustrates the possible events and adaptive actions
in a time step with examples. As one active agent is picked at a time step, the interactions
are asynchronous. The probability p is the only parameter in APRS. The adaptive actions
are rational in that an agent always aims to prevent losing to the same opponent by altering
the local competing environment. They drive the strategies employed by the agents and
the network connections to co-evolve. The process continues until the network achieves a
macroscopically steady state.
The long-time behavior of the system can be characterized by a few macroscopic quanti-
ties. They include the fractions fR, fP , and fS of agents using the strategies-R, P, and S,
respectively, the fractions of undirected inert links lRR, lPP and lSS connecting agents using
the same strategy that would lead to a draw, and the fractions of undirected active links
lRP , lPS and lSR connecting agents using different strategies that would lead to a win-lose
situation. It should be pointed out that ARPS can be implemented with different initial
strategy assignments and initial network connections. Here, we take advantage of the sim-
plicity provided by random initial strategy assignments and the symmetry among the three
strategies so that we could focus on the discussion of the p-dependence of two link densities,
one for inert and the other for active links.
Detailed numerical simulations were carried out for ARPS. Here we focus on an initial
network of uniform degree µ = 2 and N = 10, 000 agents. The results illustrated that
fR = fP = fS = 1/3, lRR = lPP = lSS and lRP = lPS = lSR. These are expected as
no strategy plays a special role in RPS and the adaptive actions in ARPS. The random
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FIG. 2: Simulation (symbols) of (a) fR and (b) lRR and lRP in the steady state as a function of
the rewiring probability p. The data are obtained by averaging results over 300 independent runs.
The system has N = 10000 agents and a mean degree µ = 2. The two phases are indicated in (b).
Results of mean field theory as given by Eqs.(10) and (11) are included (lines) for comparison.
initial conditions make sure that all strategies are evenly present. This allows us to focus
the discussion on how lRR(p) and lRP (p) behave at long time. Fig. 2 shows the simulation
results (symbols). Fig. 2(a) confirms fR = fP = fS = 1/3 for all values of p, as expected
from symmetry consideration. Fig. 2(b) shows the behavior of lRR(p) (squares) and lRP (p)
(circles). These quantities reveal the two different phases classified by p. For 0 < p < pcri,
lRR increases monotonically with p and approaches lRR = 1/3 at p = pcri continuously
while lRP drops monotonically with p and vanishes continuously at p = pcri. In the range
pcri < p < 1, lRR = 1/3 and lRP = 0. We found that pcri ≈ 0.78 for µ = 2. We also studied
initial networks of different values of µ. The results show the same qualitative behavior, but
pcri increases with µ. For example, pcri ≈ 0.89 for µ = 4. Here, we focus on analyzing the
results for µ = 2.
For p < pcri, the system has active links and it is in the active phase. These active links
promote agents’ interactions and adaptive actions. This is a dynamic phase as strategy
switching and network rewiring persist. For p > pcri, the system has only inert links and it
is in an inactive and frozen phase. There is no more adaptive action. The two phases also
differ drastically in network structure. In the active phase, the system has a main cluster
consisting of agents using the three strategies with both active and inert links. In the frozen
phase, the system breaks into three segregated pure-strategy clusters of equal size, with each
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cluster having agents using only R, P, or S. Another noticeable feature is the discontinuous
jump from lRP = 2/9 at p = 0 to a larger value when p becomes finite. There is a similar
discontinuous jump from lRR = 1/9 at p = 0 to a smaller value. These discontinuities will
be discussed in Sec. 4.
III. MEAN-FIELD APPROACH
Inspired by previous analytic approaches [20, 22–24, 26, 27] for co-evolving agent-based
models, we formulate a theory by tracing the expected changes in the macroscopic quantities
in a time step. In principle, the system has many macroscopic variables. At the single-agent
level, we have the fractions fR, fP , and fS. At the two-agent or link level, there are the link
densities lRR, lPP , lSS, lRP , lPS and lSR. As discussed, symmetry implies lRR = lPP = lSS
and lRP = lPS = lSR. Therefore, we could take lRR and lRP as variables. Together with
fR = fP = fS = 1/3, the two variables obey lRR + lRP = 1/3. This sum rule is also
demonstrated by the simulation results in Fig. 2(b). As a result, a single variable suffices
for a theory up to the level of links. We choose lRP as the variable, although other choices
can also be made.
We formulate a theory in a way that can be readily generalized to other co-evolving
network problems. To proceed, we aim at writing down an equation for the change ∆lRP in
lRP in a time step. Based on the adaptive actions, ∆lRP is determined by: (i) the strategy
of the active agent, (ii) his local configuration including the degree κ and the numbers of
neighbors using the different strategies, (iii) the probability of losing the RPS game, (iv) the
adaptive action taken after losing, (v) the change in the number of links ∆LRP connecting an
agent using strategy-R and an agent using strategy-P (called RP-links) due to the adaptive
action. Table I gives the possible values of ∆LRP due to the adaptive actions. Schematically,
the expected change in the link density ∆lRP can be expressed in terms of the probabilities
of all possible local configurations, strategies and adaptive actions, and the corresponding
local changes in the number of RP-links as follows:
∆lRP =
∑
X=R,P,S
fX
∑
κ
PX(κ)
∑
λXY ,λXZ
QX,κ(λXY , λXZ)
λXY
κ
[
p∆LrewireRP
Ltotal
+
(1− p)∆LswitchRP
Ltotal
]
.(1)
Here, PX(κ) is the probability of an agent using strategy-X and having degree κ, Y (Z) is the
strategy which wins over (loses to) X, QX,κ(λXY , λXZ) is the probability of an agent using
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strategy-X and having degree κ to have λXY XY-links and λXZ XZ-links, ∆L
rewire
RP (∆L
switch
RP )
is the local change in RP-links due to rewiring (switching) with its possible values listed in
Table I, and Ltotal = µN/2 is the total number of links in the network.
Adaptive action Change in RP-links (∆LRP )
switch strategy from R to S −λRP
switch strategy from S to P λSR
switch strategy from P to R κ− 2λRP − λPS
agent of R cuts P then rewires to R −1
agent of R cuts P then rewires to S −1
agent of P cuts S then rewires to R +1
other actions 0
TABLE I: Changes in the number of RP-links for different adaptive actions.
Eq. (1) is general but hard to solve. Formally, the quantities in the right-hand side changes
with time as the adaptive actions proceed, and dynamical equations tracing their variations
should also be established. Fortunately, simplifications are possible when we focus only on
the long time behavior when various quantities become stable in time and close the equation
by proper approximations. Eq. (1) can be written into three terms, each corresponding to
the active agent using X = R, P, S, respectively, i.e.,
∆lRP =
2
µN
(
fR∆l
R
RP + fP∆l
P
RP + fS∆l
S
RP
)
. (2)
For given strategy-X and value of κ, there is an expected value
∑
λXY ,λXZ
QX,κ(λXY , λXZ)(· · · ) ≡ 〈· · · 〉λ|X,κ (3)
for the agents using strategy-X and having exactly degree κ to be carried out. The notation
〈· · · 〉λ|X,κ stresses two points: (i) the average is taken over possible λ’s and (ii) the result is
a function of X and κ. Similarly, we further define an expected value over possible values of
the degrees for agents using strategy-X as:
∑
κ
PX(κ)(· · · ) ≡ 〈· · · 〉κ|X , (4)
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with the result depending on the strategy-X. The quantities ∆lRRP , ∆l
P
RP , and ∆l
S
RP in Eq. (2)
can be expressed in terms of these expected values. Explicitly, they can be expressed by
using Table I as
∆lRRP = −p (fR + fS)
〈
〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ
κ
〉
κ|R
− (1− p)
〈〈
λRP
2
〉
λ|R,κ
κ
〉
κ|R
,
∆lPRP = pfR
〈
〈λPS〉λ|P,κ
κ
〉
κ|P
+(1− p)

〈〈λPS〉λ|P,κ〉
κ|P
− 2
〈
〈λPSλRP 〉λ|P,κ
κ
〉
κ|P
−
〈〈
λPS
2
〉
λ|P,κ
κ
〉
κ|P

 ,
∆lSRP = (1− p)
〈〈
λSR
2
〉
λ|S,κ
κ
〉
κ|S
, (5)
where the terms proportional to p are due to rewiring and those proportional to (1− p) are
due to strategy switching.
To proceed, we make approximations to the expected values so as to close the equa-
tions. Firstly, the equations can be simplified by the symmetry of the three strategies.
As a result, it is sufficient to consider the expected values in regard to only one of the
strategies. Without loss of generality, we retain averages over agents using strategy-R.
The other expected values for strategies-P and S are given by:
〈
〈λPS〉λ|P,κ /κ
〉
κ|P
=〈
〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ /κ
〉
κ|R
,
〈〈
λ2PS
〉
λ|P,κ
/κ
〉
κ|P
=
〈〈
λ2SR
〉
λ|S,κ
/κ
〉
κ|S
=
〈〈
λ2RP
〉
λ|R,κ
/κ
〉
κ|R
, and〈
〈λPSλRP 〉λ|P,κ /κ
〉
κ|P
=
〈
〈λRPλSR〉λ|R,κ /κ
〉
κ|R
. Secondly, the expected values can be ex-
pressed in terms of the macroscopic quantities (link densities and fractions) that we want
to solve. The expected values
〈
〈λXY 〉λ|X,κ
〉
κ|X
and 〈κ〉κ|X are readily given by
〈
〈λXY 〉λ|X,κ
〉
κ|X
=
µ
2fX
lXY
〈κ〉κ|X =
µ
2fX
(lXY + lXZ + 2lXX) .
(6)
The first equation follows from lXY =
2
µN
nX〈λXY 〉X , where nX is the number of agents
using strategy-X. It says that the total number of XY-links is given by the product of nX
and the average number of XY-links per agent using strategy-X. The second equation relates
the mean degree 〈κ〉κ|X among agents using strategy-X to the link densities.
For agents using strategy-R of a certain degree κ, the first moment 〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ and the
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second moment
〈
λ2RP
〉
λ|R,κ
are related to the expected value and the variance of λRP respec-
tively, and the mixed moment 〈λRP · λSR〉λ|R,κ is related to the covariance of λRP and λSR
via [32]
〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ = E(λRP )〈
λ2RP
〉
λ|R,κ
= var(λRP ) + 〈λRP 〉
2
λ|R,κ
〈λRP · λSR〉λ|R,κ = cov(λRP , λSR) + 〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ 〈λSR〉λ|R,κ .
(7)
We invoke a trinomial closure scheme to handle E(λRP ), var(λRP ) and cov(λRP , λSR) and
close the equations. It is an extension of the binomial closure scheme in two-strategy
models [22–24, 26]. The essence is to treat averages 〈· · · 〉λ|X,κ that involve the sums∑
λXY ,λXZ
QX,κ(λXY , λXZ)(· · · ) approximately. Physically, QX,κ(λXY , λXZ) is the probabil-
ity of having exactly λXY XY-links, λXZ XZ-links and (κ−λXY −λXZ) XX-links, giving an
agent with κ neighbors using the strategy-X. This echoes the question on the distribution of
three possible outcomes i = 1, 2, 3, each occurring with the probability pi, in n independent
trials. The resulting trinomial distribution gives the expected numbers npi for the three
outcomes, with the variances given by npi(1 − pi) and the covariances between different
outcomes i and j given by −npipj [32, 33]. Here, the degree κ plays the role of n. The
probabilities p1, p2 and p3 are the conditional probabilities of encountering a neighbor using
strategies-R, P and S respectively, given the strategy-X of an agent of degree κ. Re-defining
the symbols of the probabilities as ρR|X,κ, ρP |X,κ and ρS|X,κ respectively and invoking the
trinomial closure scheme, we have
〈λRP 〉λ|R,κ = κ · ρP |R,κ〈
λ2RP
〉
λ|R,κ
= κ · ρP |R,κ
(
1− ρP |R,κ
)
+
(
κ · ρP |R,κ
)2
〈λRP · λSR〉λ|R,κ = κ · ρP |R,κ · ρS|R,κ (−1 + κ) .
(8)
To express all quantities in terms of the link densities, we make the further approximation
ρY |X,κ =
lXY
2lXX + lXY + lXZ
(9)
that the probability ρY |X,κ is given by the fraction of out-going XY-links pointing to the
neighbors using strategy-Y from all agents using strategy-X. Note that this assumption does
not distinguish between different degrees κ as ρY |X,κ is independent of κ.
Finally, using Eqs. (5), (8), and (9) allows us to express all the quantities in Eq. (2) in
terms of a link density and thus close the equation. The expected value in Eq. (2) vanish at
long time. Setting the resulting equation to zero gives the link density lRP as a function of
the rewiring probability p. The non-trivial solution of lRP (p) is found to be
lRP (p) =
2
9
(
1−
p
3(µ− 1)(1− p)
)
=
2
9pcri
pcri − p
1− p
(10)
for p < pcri with
pcri =
3(µ− 1)
3µ− 2
, (11)
and lRP (p) = 0 for p > pcri. Results for lRR(p) follow form lRR(p) + lRP (p) = 1/3.
The analytic results in Eqs. (10) and (11) are shown in Fig. 2(b) (lines) for comparison
for the case of µ = 2. The results and the simulation results are in good agreement. The
theory captures the two phases and the behavior of the phase transition. There are slight
discrepancies near the phase transition. The theory predicts that pcri = 3/4 for µ = 2, which
is slightly lower than pcri ≈ 0.78 obtained by numerical simulations. The theory predicts a
shift in pcri to a higher value with increasing µ, which is a feature also observed in numerical
simulations.
IV. ACTIVE AGENTS WIN MORE THAN PASSIVE AGENTS VIA CO-
EVOLVING MECHANISM
The discrepancies between analytic and simulation results, despite small, reveals impor-
tant information on the validity of the assumptions in the mean-field approach and the
effects of the co-evolving mechanism, as we now show. In every turn, the active agent may
win, lose, or draw. Recording the probabilities of winning, losing, and drawing of the active
agents over many rounds, the averages f
win
, f
draw
and f
lose
of these probabilities for the
active agents can be obtained. Due to the cyclic symmetry of the strategies, we could focus
on any strategy for an active agent, say R, and express the three probabilities as follows:
fwin =
〈〈
λSR
κ
〉
λ|R,κ
〉
κ|R
=
〈
ρS|R,κ
〉
κ|R
= 〈fwin,κ〉κ|R
f
draw
=
〈〈
λRR
κ
〉
λ|R,κ
〉
κ|R
=
〈
ρR|R,κ
〉
κ|R
= 〈fdraw,κ〉κ|R
f lose =
〈〈
λRP
κ
〉
λ|R,κ
〉
κ|R
=
〈
ρP |R,κ
〉
κ|R
= 〈flose,κ〉κ|R .
(12)
11
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
f w
in
d
ra
w
lo
se
Sim. Theo.
f win
f draw
f lose
FIG. 3: Simulation (symbols) and mean-field results (lines) of fwin, fdraw and f lose in the steady
state as a function of p. The simulation data are obtained by averaging over 300 realizations in
networks of N = 10000. The mean degree is µ = 2.
The quantities ρS|R,κ, ρR|R,κ and ρP |R,κ were introduced in Eq. (8). They are conditional
probabilities of encountering a neighbor using strategies-R, P and S respectively, given that
the strategy of the active agent is R and the degree is κ. In the present context, they are
also the probabilities of winning (fwin,κ), drawing (fdraw,κ) and losing (flose,κ) of an active
agent who has a degree κ.
Fig. 3 shows the numerical results of these probabilities as a function of p for the case of
mean degree µ = 2. These results are illuminating. At p = 0, f
win
= f
draw
= f
lose
= 1/3.
A slight deviation from p = 0 immediately makes fwin , fdraw and f lose different from 1/3
with a jump. For p > 0, these quantities also illustrate the existence of two phases. In the
active phase, fwin and f lose drops monotonically with p and vanish for p > pcri, while fdraw
increases monotonically with p and becomes unity for p > pcri. The most important feature
is f
win
> f
lose
for active agents in the active phase, i.e., active agents are more likely to win
on average. In contrast, passive agents are more likely to loss on average. Thus, examining
the numerical results of fwin , fdraw and f lose indicates a deficiency in the theory. The
theory assumes f
win
= f
lose
and approximates them by
〈
ρS|R,κ
〉
κ|R
=
〈
ρP |R,κ
〉
κ|R
= 3lRP/2
(see Eq. (9)). The analytic results of fwin, f lose and fdraw are also shown in Fig. 3 (lines)
for comparison. For a large part of p below pcri, the analytic results lie between the actual
f
win
and f
lose
. However, for p . pcri, the analytic results go below both fwin and f lose. The
analytic results are in exact agreement with the simulation results right at p = 0, but do
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FIG. 4: Simulation results of fwin,κ, flose,κ, gwin,κ and glose,κ in the steady state for agents of
different degrees κ at p = 0.3 for systems with mean degree (a) µ = 2 and (b) µ = 4. The data
are obtained by averaging results of 300 independent runs in a network of N = 10000. The lines
joining the data points serve as a guide to the eyes.
not predict the jump in f
win
, f
draw
and f
lose
for any deviation from p = 0.
We now discuss the validity of the mean field theory in light of these features. In the
theory, the quantity ρY |X,κ, which is the fraction of links to neighbors using strategy-Y for
agents using strategy-X and having κ neighbors, is approximated by Eq. (9) and assumed
to be independent of κ. Thus, fwin,κ, flose,κ and flose,κ are also assumed to be independent
of κ. At p = 0, there is no rewiring. The network is static and every agent has the same
number µ of neighbors. The fact that the theory gives the correct value at p = 0 but not for
p 6= 0 implies that the spread in the values of κ becomes important when rewiring is present.
Indeed, agents acquire different values of κ due to the rewiring mechanism. Fig. 4 shows the
simulation results of fwin,κ and flose,κ as a function of κ at a fixed p = 0.3 for two different
systems of µ = 2 and µ = 4. We also recorded the winning and losing probabilities gwin,κ
and glose,κ of passive agents of degree κ and showed the results. It is important to note that
fwin,κ and flose,κ do depend on κ, and so do gwin,κ and glose,κ. This dependence on κ, which
enters for any p 6= 0, causes the mean field theory to miss the jump in the probabilities as
p starts to take on finite values (see Fig. 3).
Closer inspection of the results in Fig. 4 reveal that fwin,κ > flose,κ and gwin,κ > glose,κ for
κ < µ; but fwin,κ < flose,κ and gwin,κ < glose,κ for κ > µ. Although the results in Fig. 4 were
obtained for p = 0.3, we examined the range of 0 < p < pcri and found the same features.
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Thus, an active or passive agent with a degree smaller (larger) than the mean degree µ is
more likely to win than to lose (to lose than to win) in a RPS game, while the probabilities of
winning and losing of an active or passive agent who has a degree κ ≈ µ are nearly identical.
More importantly, fwin,κ > gwin,κ and flose,κ < glose,κ for all κ, implying that an active agent
is more likely to win than a passive agent of the same κ.
The κ-dependence of the winning and losing probabilities can be understood qualitatively
as follows. An agent takes actions to make his neighborhood better, i.e., to enhance his
chance of winning. Switching strategy helps an active agent to win over the same opponent
if they meet again (provided that their strategies are not further altered before they meet
again). Rewiring dissatisfying link lowers the losing probability of an active agent when he
becomes involved in a RPS game later. Generally, the neighborhood of an active (a passive)
agent gets better (gets worse) after an adaptive action takes place. The probability of an
agent to be chosen as an active agent in a time step is 1/N . However, the probability of
an agent being a passive agent depends on his degree κ. Ignoring spatial correction in the
network for simplicity, the probability of being a passive agent is κ/µN , as given by the ratio
of his out-links to the total number of out-links in the network. Here, the ratio κ/µ emerges.
For agents with κ < µ, they are more likely to be active agents and thus a better chance
to shape his neighborhood to his advantage. The more favorable neighborhood gives them
a larger winning probability than losing in the next RPS game, no matter which role they
play. Therefore, the co-evolving mechanism leads to fwin,κ > flose,κ and gwin,κ > glose,κ for
κ < µ, as shown in Fig. 4. Following a similar argument, agents with κ > µ are more likely
to be passive agents. On one hand, they do not have much chance to make his neighborhood
better. On the other hand, their neighbors’ adaptive actions make the neighborhood worse.
These agents will have a higher losing probability than winning. Therefore, the co-evolving
mechanism leads to fwin,κ < flose,κ and gwin,κ < glose,κ for κ > µ, also observed in Fig. 4. The
physical picture is that agents with many neighbors (high κ) are those often defeated by
their neighbors and so the neighbors want to keep the relationship, while agents with only
a few neighbors can protect themselves from losing and strive for higher chance of winning
in the next RPS game.
The analysis on how fwin,κ and flose,κ depend on κ brings out the inadequacy of the mean
field theory in capturing the spatial correlation between neighboring agents’ strategies after
the system evolves to a steady state. The results in Fig. 4 imply ρS|R,κ > ρP |R,κ for κ < µ
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while ρS|R,κ < ρP |R,κ for κ > µ. Such correlations are not captured by the approximation of
ρY |X,κ by Eq. (9). This inadequacy also leads to the discrepancies in evaluating lRP and lRR
for 0 < p < pcri, in addition to fwin, fdraw and f lose. Finally, the analysis in Fig. 4 provides
an understanding of why the averaged probabilities f
win
> f
lose
, as shown in Fig. 3. It is
a combined effect of (i) a randomly selected neighbor (passive agent) is expected to have
a higher degree than a randomly selected agent (active agent) [34], and (ii) fwin,κ > gwin,κ
(flose,κ < glose,κ) and they decrease (increase) monotonically as κ increases (see Fig. 4).
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we have proposed and studied an adaptive Rock-Paper-Scissors model
(ARPS) in detail, with a focus on issues related to formulating a mean field theory for co-
evolving network problems with multiple strategies. In ARPS, three cyclically dominating
strategies are involved in a co-evolving network. An agent with a dissatisfied neighbor takes
action to improve his competing neighborhood by rewiring the dissatisfying link with a
probability p or switching to a strategy that could defeat the neighbor with a probability
(1 − p). The network shows two different phases: an active phase for p < pcri and a
frozen phase for p > pcri. The active phase is characterized by one connected network
with agents using different strategies continually interacting and taking adaptive actions.
The frozen phase is characterized by three separate clusters of agents using R, P, and S,
respectively and terminated adaptive actions. We have discussed in detail the formulation of
a mean-field theory that starts with tracing the changes in a link density due to all possible
adaptive actions as the network evolves. A trinomial closure scheme, which approximates
the distribution of different types of lines that an agent carries given his strategy and degree,
has been invoked to close the equation. Ignoring the dependence on the degree, the theory
gives an analytic expression for the link density as a function of p. The results agree with
simulation results well and capture the two-phase structure.
Closer examination of the small deviations between analytic and simulation results turns
out to be illuminating. We have studied the averaged probabilities of winning (f
win
), drawing
(fdraw) and losing (f lose) for active agents. It was found that fwin is always higher than f lose
in the active phase - a feature that the mean field theory does not capture. The origin has
been traced to the spread in the degrees among agents due to rewiring and the dependence
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of the winning and losing probabilities on the degree of agents. We have found that agents
with a degree smaller (larger) than the mean degree µ have a larger (smaller) probability
of winning than losing. Physically, active agents tend to have smaller degrees than passive
agents because links are retained or increased only for agents who are being taken advantage
of. The results are useful in that the inclusion of correlations between the nearest neighbors’
strategies and degrees should give a more accurate theory.
We close with a discussion on a few possible extensions. In the present work, we simplified
the discussion by using the symmetry that comes from the cyclically dominating strategies as
well as the random initial strategy assignments. It will be interesting to study the sensitivity
of the steady state to different initial strategy distributions. The theory presented here can
also be modified to study the problem. Here, we discussed the analytic approach not only
for applying the results to ARPS, but also in a general way that could be readily modified to
other co-evolving network models involving multiple strategies. These models need not be
cyclically dominating and the number of strategies could be more than three. The detailed
study on the reasons of the small deviation between analytic and simulation results provides
useful information on how better theories can be formulated. The analytic results also
provides a guide for further studies on the scaling behavior near the transition between the
two phases.
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